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Benefits for soldiers follow the formation of ancient and present day armies raised
for the purpose of extending the national or state will. Veterans   benefits for defenders of
the U.S. emerged during the American colonial period. College benefits began after
WWII with the GI Bill of Rights.
This  study examines the variations in purpose for nationally established
educational benefits for veterans and the singular value to the veterans of these
5educational benefits. The study begins with an overview of the history of veterans 
benefits. Primary emphasis is then placed on the educational portion of the World War II
Servicemen s Readjustment Act and the current educational benefit, the Montgomery GI
Bill. 
As the purpose of awarding educational benefits changed from World War II to 
the latest U.S. war, the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the economic value to the individual
veteran also changed. The WWII GI Bill featured an educational provision intended to
keep returning veterans out of the changing economy whereas current GI Bills is
intended as a recruiting incentive for an all-volunteer force. Correspondingly, the
economic value to the individual veteran has changed.
Data supporting this study were extracted from historical documents in primary
and secondary scholarly studies and writings, government documents, national
newspapers and periodicals, Veterans Administration publications, service newspapers,
and anecdotal writings.
The study offers conclusions regarding the shifting purposes and economic value
and recommends changes to current and future GI Bills. The conclusions of this study
are: (a) the purpose of the Montgomery GI Bill is to serve as a recruitment tool for the
armed force, whereas the WWII GI Bill emphasized concern over the return of millions
of veterans to a changing wartime economy unable to offer full employment and, (b) the
present GI Bill funds less than 50% of the costs for a 4-year degree while the first GI Bill
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On June 22, 1994, the 50th anniversary of the Servicemen  s Readjustment Act of
1944, many lauded this federal legislation for veterans because it became a program that
spanned the breadth of social, economic, and cultural affairs in the United States. The
president of the United States issued a proclamation (Proclamation 6703, 1994)
acclaiming the contributions of the bill. Universities and colleges, corporations, veterans
organizations, and ordinary citizens across the country joined in, acknowledging the
value of the GI Bill to U.S. society as well as to individual citizens.  All components of
the first comprehensive veterans legislation passed by the federal government--housing,
health, unemployment, and education--were critical to rebuilding the economy and to the
reintegration of veterans into society. But, no benefit was more progressive than the
education component, which become known as the GI Bill. 
The list of the social and economic contributions of the education component of
the GI Bill is lengthy and equally  touches the full range of any measurement of the
progress of the U.S. over the past 50 years. The basic statistics concerning the results of
the GI Bill are widely known: (a) 2,232,000 WWII veterans enrolled in college with
another 5.5 million enrolling in training courses; (b) $14.5 billion dollars funneled into
American institutions of higher learning; and  (c) approximately $10 for every federal
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dollar spent returned to the treasury by these veterans. The GI Bill became known as the
  law that changed America    (Department of Veterans Affairs, n.d.b).
Subsequent educational GI Bills, including those from the wars in Korea,
Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf (Montgomery GI Bill) began changing in both purpose
and value to the veteran (for an early letter by the author on the economic value of the
MGIB see Appendix I). In fact, the present GI Bill, the Montgomery GI Bill, pales in
economic comparison to earlier bills and especially in comparison to the WWII GI Bill.
Requiring monthly pay deductions, with just 3 years of low payments, the Montgomery
GI Bill veteran is slowly becoming less visible on college campuses. In 1947 however,
the WWII GI Bill veterans constituted nearly 50% of the college enrollment.
 What has happened to a program that has meant so much to U.S. society? From a
program that led to a sound economy and rewarded veterans for their enormous
contributions to the defense of the United States to a minor program that attempts to
solicit enlistments and has little impact on the economy, the GI Bill is losing its status as
  the law that changed America.    
Statement of the Problem
The problem of this study was to investigate the educational component of the
four GI Bills and to compare their purposes and economic value to individual veterans. 
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to examine the history of U.S. veterans   benefits in
general and veterans   educational benefits in particular. The study focused on the
purposes and the individual economic value of the education portion of the original,
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intervening, and present GI Bills. The study  employed the historical method of basic
research and used chronological and thematic techniques of historical research.
Research Questions
This research attempted to answer the following questions:
1. What was the primary purpose of the education portion of the GI Bill
passed by Congress and authorized by the president after the following
wars or conflicts: (a) World War II, (b) the Korean War, (c) the Vietnam
War, and (d) the Persian Gulf War?
2. What was the relationship between the payments authorized by the GI Bill
and the rate of college tuition at a standard public university for the
following GI Bills: (a) World War II, (b) the Korean War, (3) the Vietnam
War, and (4) the Persian Gulf War?
Significance of the Study
The study has a twofold significance. First, U.S. national policy with regard to the
GI Bill  s purpose in society is presently unclear. Second, the economic or financial value
of the Montgomery GI Bill is becoming the subject of serious discussion in Congress and
within veterans  and higher education organizations. Is the GI Bill a tool for national
government control over some aspects of the economy, a national recruitment incentive,
or a reward programs for veterans? There should be a clear, comprehensive policy with
regard to the social reasons for U.S. commitment of funds to a program as expensive as
the GI Bill. This study has been undertaken to determine whether the reasons for a GI
Bill are grounded in continuing policy or whether the policy has shifted or is shifting.
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Secondly, this study is important in determining the value of the GI Bill to the individual
veteran.
Limitations of the Study
This study is limited in that it does not examine all educational programs within
the active forces, the reserve forces, or programs for veterans other than the GI Bill. The
study does not explore interim periods of eligibility for educational programs, nor does it 
explore all of the possible political, social, or economic aspects of the GI Bill.  Moreover,
the study does not inquire into the subdivision benefits of the GI Bill, such as housing,
loans, and health care.
Delimitation of the Study
The delimitations of this study are the focus on the educational component of the
four major GI Bills (WWII, Korea, Vietnam, and the Montgomery GI bill). The study
does not pursue all of the active-duty tuition assistance programs, reserve forces (national
guard and reserve) programs, or veterans   educational programs, such as rehabilitation
and training. Further, the study does not pursue the matter of eligibility gaps among the
major GI bills.
Basic Assumptions
The primary assumption of this study is that U.S. society and the national
government presently have the desire to continue to provide educational benefits to
veterans.
Definition of Terms
The following terms are used in this study:
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GI Bill: In the present study this term applies specifically to that portion of the GI
Bill that pertains to higher education benefits for currently serving or discharged
veterans. Used in this context the term does not apply to other limited types of
educational programs, such as vocational rehabilitation, or the active duty programs such
as tuition assistance. 
Enlistment, recruiting, or recruitment incentive: A monetary program designed
and offered as an inducement to enlistment in the armed forces. 
Servicemember or service member: A term used to describe anyone serving in the
United States armed forces.
Soldier: An all-inclusive term that includes active duty or discharged veterans of
the following uniformed services: the United States Army, the United States Navy, the
United States Air Force, the United States Marine Corps, the United States Coast Guard. 
Tuition: Tuition in this study includes tuition payments for classes, fees, and other
costs directly associated with academic work on the campus. Tuition does not include the
costs associated with room and board, transportation, and other living expenses.
Veteran: A former service member honorably discharged from the United States
armed forces.
Veterans   benefit: Pre- or post-service benefit, either monetary or non-monetary,
that encourages men and women to serve in the armed services and rewards or cares for
them after service. 
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Servicemen s Readjustment Act of 1944: Commonly referred to as the GI Bill of
Rights, the WWII GI Bill, or the GI Bill. A copy of the educational component of this bill
can be found in Appendix B.
Veterans   Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952: Commonly referred to as the
Korean War GI Bill or Korean GI Bill. A copy of the educational component of this bill
can be bound in Appendix D.
Veterans   Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966: Commonly referred to as the
Vietnam War GI Bill or the Vietnam-Era GI Bill. A copy of the educational component
of this bill can be found in Appendix E. 
Veterans   Educational Assistance Act of 1984: Commonly referred to as the
Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB), the Persian Gulf-Era GI Bill, and the current or present GI




Historical Examination of Veterans  Benefits
Benefits for warriors, conscripted or recruited, were provided to the soldiers of
great armies of ancient days. The fighting forces of ancient Egypt were rewarded for their
service with land grants, and the promise of the spoils of war, booty, land, and slaves
spurred ancient Babylonians to victory in battle (Gosoroski, 1996). Thus, the foundations
for pre- and post-service benefits for those who fought for their group, nation,  country,
or cause were laid in ancient times. 
Ancient Greeks, within the philosophy of Sparta, committed fully to the military 
profession of defending the state by becoming Spartans. In fact, the only path to full 
citizenship in Sparta was as a result of service in the Spartan army (Gosoroski, 1996). 
Roman rewards for soldiering steadily  evolved throughout the history of Roman Empire. 
Romans began the practice of full pay for members of the legion, medical care following 
battle, land upon discharge, bonuses upon discharge, and special municipal officers  
positions (Gosoroski, 1996).
The many wars of the Middle Ages created a large number of veterans, and,
especially because of the means of fighting, many disabled veterans. Most of these
veterans were left to fend for themselves, generally by presenting themselves to
monasteries for charity. Upon the collapse of the feudal system, the majority of these
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veterans took to the streets as beggars and thieves. Several kings of France, however, 
established hospices for their wounded veterans. In 1670 Louis IX constructed a home
for veterans blinded from the sun during service in the Middle East (Rosenburg, 1993).
King Henry IV had compassion for the begging veterans and founded a veterans  home--
complete with a  bureaucracy to which veterans with appropriate documentation could
apply. Subsequent kings of France, failing to maintain this veterans   home, attempted to
resolve the issue with pensions--a scheme that fell apart because of inattention and lack
of directed funds. This rudimentary combination of institutions and pensions became a
viable system subsequently adopted by most Western nations (Gosoroski, 1997a).
Following trends in France, the British government issued returning veterans a
license to beg. An effort to help English sailors included a requirement for sailors to
contribute a portion of their earnings to a relief fund--a fund that was raided to the point
of depletion by its overseers. (Similarly, for over 100 years and continuing to the present,
in the United States, soldiers have had a small amount taken from their pay to support an
  old soldiers   home.  )
The British Parliament of 1593 established a benchmark of veterans   benefits
when it passed the Acte for the Relief of Souldiours.  Coming after the defeat of the
Spanish Armada, this act to award disability  benefits to veterans was the first by a
national legislative body. Although this document is considered seminal, it actually
resulted in few and small payments to disabled veterans, this despite subsequent reform
efforts (Gosoroski, 1996). 
9
In 1692, seven years after the death of Charles II, a veterans   hospital he initiated 
opened in Chelsea. A hospital for disabled English sailors was founded in 1702 by 
William and Mary (Severo and Milford, 1989).
Veterans Benefits in the United States
Since the Revolutionary War, Americans have served in the armed forces in 
great numbers. More than 39 million have served, with over 1 million giving their lives 
for the United States. Military service is arduous and calls for sacrifices, 
including one  s life, well beyond those normally found in any other endeavor in our
society (Spaulding, Eddy, and Chandras, 1995). In calling for men and women to make
these sacrifices, the federal and state governments have accepted, beginning before the
Revolutionary War, the commitment of George Washington when he declared that the
nation must care for those who fight its battles (Ferling, 1988).
This principle stated by George Washington notwithstanding, and while requiring
and demanding an extraordinary commitment from warriors, the United States has had
difficulty accepting the notion of comprehensive federal and state benefits for veterans,
even those who are disabled and the survivors of those killed in battle. Two primary
forces run through U.S. benefits for veterans   policies: (a) America is traditionally a
citizen-soldier nation, and (b) an attitude of antimilitarism has generally prevailed in our
society (Huntington, 1957). During the Jacksonian period, for example, attempts were
made to do away with the standing army and the school that produced most of its
officers, West Point. After World War I the regular standing army declined to a strength
of 20,000 soldiers. This current of antimilitarism reached a peak during the Vietnam War
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when soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines were scorned and even despised, because
they were blamed directly for an unpopular war. American soldiers, following the British
Anglo-Saxon tradition, are expected to leave home, bear the battle, return to society, and
accept nothing more than the thanks of a grateful nation (Wright, and MacGregor, 1987).
Early in America  s history, the idea was created that it was an honor to have served the
nation in a time of national crisis, even to the point that it was unpatriotic for one who
served to ask for benefits after such service (Severo and Milford, 1989). These societal
and national attitudes of service have in the past and are presently influencing the
awarding of benefits to veterans. To counter these influences, veterans have resorted to
protest, even mutiny, and to forming organizations to gain benefits.
Despite the philosophy influencing national and state policies toward veterans,
many U.S. leaders have called for regard and attention to those asked to fight the nation  s
battles. According to President Theodore Roosevelt, in a July 4, 1903,  speech in
Springfield, Illinois,     A man who is good enough to shed his blood for his country is
good enough to be given a square deal afterwards. More than that no man is entitled to,
and less than that no man shall have    (as cited in Shafritz, 1990, p.75).
Fighting on the home front during America  s Colonial period was not uncommon.
There were Native Americans as well as British and French soldiers to fight in an effort
to gain control of the land desired by the burgeoning colonies. The First National
Conscription Act, June 2, 1792, indicates that all militiamen would provide their own
musket, a bayonet, a belt, and at least 24 cartridges (The National Conscription Act,
1792).  The task of men being called on to leave their community to take up arms created
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a new class of Americans-- veterans. Colonial society and its leaders recognized a need
to care for those who were sent away to fight when they returned to their communities.
Accordingly, The National Conscription Act provided that any militiaman   wounded or
disabled would be cared for at public expense.   The act however, did not provide any
implementing guidance for the colonies or the emerging federal government  both of
which simply ignored the act (Gosoroski, 1977a).
Roots of the colonial system of the citizen-soldier concept can be found in Philip 
Vincent s 1637 account of battles between New Englanders and Native Americans. In
this account,  merchants, planters, traders, and all able-bodied men were ordered to serve
in the militia to combat the Indians (Vincent, 1637/1974). Vincent  related the
requirements and burdens of male colonists to respond to threats rapidly with personally
provided equipment, to march and fight as soldiers, and to return to citizen status without
regard to benefits.
Colonial militiamen not only protected the home front but were sent, by the
British Crown, to fight overseas. In 1703, one hundred and thirteen men from the New
England colonies formed into two companies and departed Colonial America to serve in
the West Indies during Queen Anne s War (1703-1713). Later that year approximately
one half of the soldiers returned to Massachusetts in a physically weakened and sickly
condition. The second great overseas colonial military adventure of this period occurred
during the War of Jenkins s Ear (1739-1743). An expeditionary force of 3,600 colonists
departed for Cartagena, Columbia. Enduring unspeakable horrors during the movement
phase, the colonists fought courageously during the battle for Cartagena. Under cover of
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an American rear guard, the British troops withdrew to the Caribbean to conduct
operations in Cuba and off the coast of Central America. At the conclusion of this
British-led debacle, men of the American force, minus 1,200, returned to their colonies.
Newspapers of the day reported that the veterans suffered far beyond what could
normally be expected in a war of this kind. Twenty years later, in 1762, four thousand
colonists participated once again on the side of the British in a war between England and
France. Deployed to the familiar Caribbean region, the soldiers were devastated by
deadly diseases and battle. Victory ceremonies were held upon their return, but official
support in terms of benefits were not offered by the colonies. Additionally, according to
Ferling (1985), Severo and Milford (1989), and Gosoroski (1997a), who chronicled these
overseas adventures of colonial American forces, no record exists of England providing
any relief to these veterans. Once again, a new class of Americans was born  the veteran
of foreign wars.  
Several legislative bodies in the colonies recognized some need to care for
returning militiamen who needed assistance. In 1624, the Virginia House of Burgesses,
passed a law that called for public care for wounded and disabled soldiers--according to
their needs or station in life. Although it set a standard for subsequent acts, this act did
not reach the approval stage because the bearer of the legislation died in transit to the
English approving authority. Twenty years later, however, Virginia enacted a similarly
worded law. However, these acts provided little, if any, actual benefits (Gosoroski,
1997a).
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With knowledge of the act mentioned above, colonists established two grand
principles inherent in society today. The first was that soldiers disabled in defense of the
colony deserved the compassion of those who were defended. The second principle,
emerging from compassion for disabled veterans, firmly ingrained the attitude that
military service was an honorable endeavor. But, beyond these two principles, actual
benefits for colonial militiamen and their subsequent heirs, the American soldiers, were
obtained only through great effort (Ferling, 1985). 
In line with these developing attitudes, the settlers of Plymouth Colony passed an 
act directing the citizens to care for all those wounded and disabled in defense of the 
colony. Passed in 1636, this law set a precedent of public relief for veterans of 
Colonial America and the United States of America under both the Articles of
Confederation and the U.S. Constitution (Department of Veterans Affairs, n.d.a;  Ferling,
1985).
After the initiatives related above become law, other colonies began to follow suit 
by enacting veterans   benefits laws--Maryland in 1662, New York in 1691, North 
Carolina in 1715, New Hampshire in 1718, Rhode Island in 1718, Georgia in 1755, and 
Delaware in 1756. New Jersey and Pennsylvania passed laws in 1777 to assist 
Revolutionary War soldiers and sailors. These laws varied in benefits, but generally 
awarded minor compensation; some tax exemptions; exemption from arrest for arrears in
taxes, debt, and ferriage fees; land grants; and licenses to operate taverns (Gosoroski,
1997a).
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The Revolutionary War began an upsurge in veterans   demands for benefits. 
Early in the formation of a regular force, Continental Army officers, mindful of British
and other European country practices, began to agitate for half pay for life upon
conclusion of the war. Congress rejected this notion out of a desire to avoid creating an
elite military class common to those in European countries. In this regard, George
Washington, siding initially with the Congress, changed his mind when the officers
threatened to resign (Ferling, 1988). On August 26, 1776, the Continental Congress, by
resolution, in an attempt to improve morale and to cut down on desertions, promised
pensions to soldiers after the war (Department of Veterans Affairs Handbook, 1998). 
Washington then lobbied Congress to offer one-half pay for officers and $80.00 for
enlisted men for 7 years upon cessation of hostilities. Congress subsequently asked states
to make such payments to soldiers, as well as benefits to widows. Congress and the states
dallied on the matter for several years. 
At the close of the Revolutionary War, in an event termed the Newburgh Incident,
Continental Army officers  refused to leave service until benefits were realized and not
just promised by Congress and the states. Enlisted soldiers similarly rioted, refusing to
muster out until bonuses were paid (Bonwick, 1991). Through the intervention of George
Washington, Congress compromised by voting officers full pay for 5  years, enlisted
soldiers full pay for 4 months. The officers   primary reason for this request was that, by
lengthy service, they had been deprived of wealth building through business
opportunities presented to those who did not serve. Most veterans went home, however,
with no pay, only promises. Because the Continental Congress paid veterans in scrip that
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could not be converted to real dollars or, even worse, turned out to be worthless, veterans
began to sense that the new U.S. government would not hold true to promises made to its
veterans (Myers,1983).
During the Revolutionary War, as a way of helping veterans, George Washington
favored the creation and sustainment of an organization called the Invalid Corps (Miller,
1966). This corps failed to materialize.
On May 13, 1783, with the support of the organization  s first president, George
Washington, Henry Knox organized the Society of the Cincinnati. One goal of this group
was to lobby on behalf of benefits for officers (Myers, 1983). In spite of George
Washington s successful resolution of the Newburgh Affair, the officers (including the
esteemed General Knox) of the Continental army continued to harbor feelings that the
new United States owed them for their Revolutionary War service (Severo & Milford,
1989). As secretary of war after the revolution, Knox continued his efforts on behalf of
veterans (Myers, 1983).
In a series of attempts to enforce the resolution for payments to veterans promised 
in 1776, the Congress in 1789, and subsequent Congresses, passed, under the title of 
Invalid Pension Acts, several laws that eventually created a system for federal  
payments to veterans (Severo and Milford, 1989). Many years and much effort would be
spent trying to enforce these acts of Congress (Myers, 1983).
Revolutionary War soldiers and sailors suffered many privations. Upon returning 
home they discovered that many men who did not join the fight had prospered. Many 
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who joined had assets prior to the war but lost almost everything during the war, while
thousands had nothing and returned with nothing. Promises of land grants, separation
bonuses, and other benefits for service in the Revolutionary army failed to materialize.
Some cities, such as Boston and New York, reported increases in crime attributable to
soldiers looking for food, clothing, and material goods (Severo and Milford, 1989). 
The plight of many Revolutionary War veterans can be seen in the experiences of 
farmer-soldier Daniel Shays. Shays, struggling to pay debts, sold, at the displeasure of his 
fellow officers, a sword given him by Marquis de Lafayette (Szatmary, 1980).
Attempting to get relief from these debts, Shays emerged as the leader of forces bent on
obtaining relief.    Shays s Rebellion   force was composed of many veteran farmers,
while its government opposition was also composed of veterans  veterans against
veterans. Included in the government force were some  Black veterans of the
Revolutionary War, all enlisted by the governor of Massachusetts to fight Shays s
rebellion (Severo and Milford). (As an aside, Harvard University formed, from its student
body, a group of cadets to help fight Shays  s forces.) In 1818, Shays applied for and
received a veteran  s pension from the U.S. government. Having asked for relief of debt
(which never came) incurred while fighting the American Revolution, Shays used his
pension to purchase land he felt was both deserved and deserved much earlier. Shays s
plight and demand for relief as a result of service was a common charge of many
Revolutionary War soldiers (Starkey, 1955).
 In 1817 President James Monroe called for a new step in veterans   pensions
when he asked that the Revolutionary War infirm, indigent, and distressed veterans
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receive a pension although they had not been wounded or sickened during the war
(Karsten, 1978). This gratuity started a serious national debate on whether the federal
government should ever offer income to the poor, veteran  s status notwithstanding.
Severo and Milford (1989), citing various historical documents, noted that this debate
over pensions for veterans not hurt or sickened in war was the first of its kind. The
debate, these authors suggested, ranged from sympathy for the plight of many veterans to
disdain for   one-hour   and   rich   veterans. Further, some debaters claimed that
nonserving citizens did as much as veterans to win the war. The bill that President
Monroe asked for was passed in March 1818 (Gosoroski, 1997b). 
As documented by Ammon (1990), the War of 1812 was fought by an army
composed of men from the states  Organized Militia. Bonuses similar to those extended
in the Revolutionary War were offered to entice men into service. Bounties and promises
of land stirred interest in service. Secretary of War John Armstrong strongly opposed up-
front payments and bonuses because such, he claimed, would not keep men in service. He
preferred end-of-service incentives as a way of maintaining the force. Andrew Jackson
persisted in giving enlistment incentives, however, and even granted comparable bonuses
and pay to two battalions of free Blacks (Williams, 1968). Benefits in the amount of
 $5 were granted to invalided enlisted personnel, while such officers received half pay.
Small pensions were also granted to some widows. Almost 40 years after the war, the
veterans of the War of 1812 began to organize into veterans  associations in an attempt to
gain federal and state benefits as a result of their war service (Ammon, 1990). 
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The years between the War of 1812 and the Civil War saw intense debates over
the concept of pensions for veterans and civilians alike. The official Department of
Veterans Affairs history (Department of Veterans Affairs, 1998) indicated that the public
swayed between too little and too many benefits for veterans. Unanticipated applications
drove up the sums required to support federal pensions. This period also saw the creation
of the Department of Veterans Affairs  seminal organization  the Bureau of Pensions.
Although not including the word veterans, this organization was formed primarily to
administer the emerging volume of veterans   pensions. During its tenure as a federal
agency this bureau moved from the secretary of war to the secretary of the navy, to the
secretary of the interior and then emerged as an independent agency. It was designated a
separate cabinet-level department in 1986, during the presidency of Ronald Reagan.
Enlistment incentives spurred many men to join the services to fight the Mexican 
War (1846-1848). The federal government offered travel pay to marshaling sites, a 
$21 clothing allowance upon enlistment, a $12 enlistment bonus, and a promise of 
160 acres of land and service-connected pensions upon completion of service
(McCaffrey, 1990). Thus, veterans  post-service benefits had reached a new level in that
the initial declaration of war included provisions for pre- and post-service benefits.
During service in the Mexican War, like preceding wars and the subsequent Civil War,
most deaths among soldiers were the result of disease (11,155 of a total 13,237 deaths)
(Severo and Milford, 1989). Many soldiers returned home with illnesses contracted
during this war. General Winfield Scott, taking receipts from a levy placed upon the
Mexican government, began the U.S. Military Asylum (now the U.S. Soldier  s and
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Airmen s Home) to aid in the care of disabled and 20-year-service veterans. After the
war, Mexican War veterans formed the National Association of Mexican War Veterans.
This organization was instrumental in getting Congress to pass a pension act that made
payments to elderly, disabled, and later indigent veterans (Gosoroski, 1997b).
The Civil War, on both sides, was fought almost entirely by volunteers. Along
with nationalistic or regionalistic motives, these volunteers were inspired by bonuses to
enlist. Records indicate that the federal government paid out $300 million and the states
$450 million to volunteer enlistees. By war  s end, some enlisting in the Union army
received combined federal and state bonuses of $1,000. Like those who served in
previous U.S. wars, the Union soldiers suffered unmentionable privations. Disease, poor
and crude medical treatment, and rudimentary physical hygiene in camps and on the
march contributed to many deaths and incapacitation. In fact, disease was the prevailing
cause of death in the Union army with approximately 61% succumbing to diseases such
as typhoid, malaria, acute diarrhea, smallpox, pneumonia, tuberculosis, and measles.
Three fourths of the battlefield operations were amputations. Many who survived the
disease onslaught, wounds, and amputations left the army with disease-ridden and
crippled bodies. In their detailed account of the above summary of the harshness of
service in the Civil War, Severo and Milford (1989) also chronicled how the death of a
federal soldier even caused deprivations within his family, because his next-of-kin had to
produce the finances necessary to return his remains for burial. A precursor of Gulf War
Syndrome might be detected in the post Civil War veterans illness called Irritable Heart.
The symptoms shortness of breath, palpitations, fatigue, headache, diarrhea, dizziness,
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disturbed sleep, and sharp or burning chest pain-- seem eerily similar to the Gulf War
Syndrome symptoms listed in Spaulding, Eddy, and Chandras (1997).The psychological
effects of the Civil War resulted in the first U.S. veterans  hospital, The Military Hospital
for the Insane. 
The General Pension Act of 1862 began a loose system of disability and survivor 
benefits for soldiers of the Civil War. Amended over the years, pensions were awarded
via the Sherman Act of 1912 to all Civil War and Mexican War veterans, with an
amendment in 1920 that included survivors (Gosoroski, 1997b).
The predecessor to the modern-day soldiers home was approved and signed into 
law on March 3, 1865, by President Abraham Lincoln (Rosenburg, 1993). The homes
approved under the National Asylum (later amended by law to read Home rather than
Asylum) for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers and Sailors existed until 1930. Later, President
Theodore Roosevelt, in Public Law 114, opened the home to financially distressed
veterans although they did not suffer any service-connected ailments (Gosoroski, 1997b).
One veteran said,    Empty sleeves, single legs, eyeless sockets and emaciated bodies
point out the demand for organized work     (as cited in Gosoroski, 1997b, p.30). This war
survivor was indicating a need for a comprehensive program to care for him and his
fellow veterans after the war.
Following a minimal practice started by the original 13 states, many northern
Civil War states awarded benefits to soldiers and sailors. Some states started homes along
the lines of the federally established homes, offered tax breaks, and certified a special
preference in hiring, burial expenses, and small bonuses. On the other hand, many
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soldiers suffered discriminatory employment practices, including an attitude that veterans
were unstable, untutorable, unattainable, and unmanageable (Severo & Milford, 1989).
As later occurred with Vietnam veterans, tracts were issued by pro-soldier and sailor
groups advising against disclosure of wartime service. Also, as in earlier and later wars,
soldiers and sailors were blamed for a rise in the crime rate. Moreover, many soldiers and
sailors of the Civil War, as they did in later wars, became drug addicts (morphine, heroin,
and other drugs used for anesthetics), blaming their addictions on drugs administered in
the army and navy. 
Organizations to help the veterans, just as after previous wars, sprang from the
necessity of veterans to influence government aid. The largest of the post-Civil War
veterans   organizations was the Grand Army of the Republic (G.A.R.). (Other minor
organizations were the Soldiers  and Sailors  National Union League, the Boys in Blue,
and the Republican Veterans Union.) Formed by an obstetrician, Dr. Benjamin
Stephenson of Decatur, Illinois, this organization, the G.A.R., became very powerful in
politics, creating a societal and political attitude of care and regard for veterans and
shaping what became known as the   veterans vote   (McConnell, 1992).  
Confederate veterans, wounded, disabled, and indigent, returned home to fend for 
themselves. Northern and Reconstruction-era politicians used the Fourteenth Amendment 
to deny federal benefits to Confederate veterans. Public Law 85-425, passed on May 23,
1958,  pardoned all veterans of the Confederacy and awarded the last surviving
Confederate soldier a pension, almost symbolically. Southern states, because of economic
impoverishment, found little money to pay their veterans. Most states ultimately offered
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prosthetic devices or one-time payments for loss of sight, limb, and other disabilities.
Louisiana and Texas dispensed land to confederate veterans (Logue, 1996). Although
Lincoln supported soldiers homes, Jefferson Davis, just before the end of the war, vetoed
legislation that would create a soldiers   home (Rosenburg, 1993). Twenty years after the
war, the first home for veterans of the Confederacy opened. Ill-treatment by southern
society and Reconstructionists stirred six Confederate veterans to form the Ku Klux
Klan, an organization with idealistic goals, but which in practice fomented hatred in
direct opposition to their lofty rationale for being (Sims, 1996).
Black Union veterans, serving alongside White veterans, received less pay for 
their service. Promised post-service bounties, Black veterans, many of whom returned to 
their homes in the South, never collected. Said two Black Union veterans from Louisiana 
in an 1867 letter to the secretary of war,   (We) are about to be mustered out without any 
bounty. (We) have no space to live. After serving the U.S.A. almost three years then to 
put (us) out without anything   (Berlin, Reidy, & Rowlands, 1982, p. 100). Similar to the
Klan, the Grand Army of the Republic failed to live up to its ideals in that it seldom aided 
Black Union veterans in their fight to acquire earned benefits (Davies, 1947). Even the 
ladies auxiliary, the Women  s Relief Corps, rejected wives, mothers, and daughters of 
Black Union veterans. According to a professor of history at the University of Wisconsin,
the national leadership of the G.A.R. supported the southern posts in their exclusion of
Black veterans by suggesting that the Union veterans living in the South must conform to
the social norms and values of that region (Coffman, 1986). To look out for their
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interests, Black veterans founded the Colored Soldier s and Sailor s League (Colored
Veterans, 1887).
Together, both Union and Confederate veterans were generally expected to take 
care of themselves, physical and psychological wounds notwithstanding. Union soldiers, 
encouraged to participate in the political process by being allowed to return home to vote 
during the mid-war presidential election, were discriminated against by both the 
government and the private sector after the war. Except for the friendship of President 
Abraham Lincoln and the emerging power of veterans  organizations, Civil War veterans 
would have had to endure many indignities, much scorn, and outright discrimination.
The Spanish American War, although a short war, became the impetus for several 
subsequent activities by and on behalf of veterans. The U.S. government failed to 
acknowledge that veterans had contracted various tropical diseases, claiming that the
soldiers were merely homesick and pining or longing for the ways back home (Severo
and Milford, 1989). During internal investigations, the war department blamed individual
soldiers for acquiring a multitude of tropical diseases, causing the New York Times in
1898 to editorialize on the incompetence of the war department (Severo and  Milford,
1989). Historians have documented the demobilization after the Spanish-American War
as nothing but a grand debacle (Bradford, 1993; Rosenfeld, 2000).
The Spanish American War and the subsequent War in the Philippines served as
catalysts for the antimilitarist forces in the United States, an attitude that has lasted for
many years, in fact, into a later Asian War, the Vietnam War (Fox, 2000). The rise in
such an attitude contributed to a general disregard for veterans claiming benefits. Severo
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and Milford (1989) documented a typical case of a veteran  s applying for a pension
because of malaria and the associated health problems he claimed to have contracted in
Cuba, yet he never received a pension because of a new attitude on the part of the
government that the burden was strictly upon the soldier to prove that his condition
resulted from service (termed today as service-connected). It was the government s
position that these soldiers merely suffered from homesickness and nostalgia. In fact, the
secretary of war at the time placed the blame on the soldiers. He did not, however,
indicate how individual soldiers and sailors should have protected themselves against
malaria, yellow fever, and typhoid.
World War I veterans had great difficulty in readjusting to civilian life. 
The war introduced new and intensely deadly forms of fighting, such as trench warfare
and high rate-of-fire machine guns. Chemical warfare, tanks, high firepower weapons,
and aerial warfare overlaid the traditional siege and final assault mentality of previous
wars (Schaffer, 1994.).Veterans of WWI, once demobilized and returned to society in
huge numbers, fought for years for some benefits. The Great Depression, however,
interfered, and few benefits were forthcoming. Spurned by their government, a large
group of veterans marched to Washington, D.C. and demanded immediate payment of a
promised bonus (the bonus was to be paid in full in 1945). Violence erupted when
General Douglas MacArthur was ordered to clear the veterans  encampment (Daniels,
1971). The Bonus March of 1932 continued and spurred greater action on behalf of
veterans seeking some small degree of benefits for their service. The period after WWI
saw better organized and more effective veterans organizations such as the American
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Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and the Disabled American Veterans. Following
the model of veterans of previous wars, veterans sensed a need to form an organization
that would protect their interests. Different from past wars, however, was the haste with
which such an organization became viable. Before the war was barely over, veterans met
in Paris in1919 to form the American Legion (Marquis, 1923).
Like minorities in previous wars conducted by the U.S., Blacks were returned to a 
society that failed to recognize their contributions and achievements. W.E.B. DuBois, 
after encouraging African Americans to support and enlist in World War I, had to 
vigorously take up their cause for equality after World War I (DuBois, 1986). 
Realizing a need to bring better organization to postwar veterans  programs, the 
government in 1921 formed the Veteran s Bureau. Around this same time the 
government formed the Federal Bureau of Vocational Rehabilitation. Ten years later,
only 
217 veterans were said to have been trained or retrained for jobs. The bureaucracy turned 
against veterans through the activities of the scandalous director, Colonel Charles R. 
Forbes (Daniels, 1971).
The states, after most of the wars involving the U.S., individually provide various
benefits to veterans. Recently, for example, Minnesota provided a $600 bonus to its
29,000 Persian Gulf War veterans (Frontlines, 1999). Texas provides a GI Bill, the
Hazelwood Act, to veterans who have exhausted their federal GI Bill benefits. Other
states continue to provide various benefits, ranging from free fishing licenses to
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education for children of service members killed in war or who die later from injuries
received during war.
Military services conduct training of their active force to prepare that force for
war. There is little time left for educational endeavors and the services normally leave
education to the veteran upon discharge yet the Union Army during the Civil War
established schools within the army to educate Black troops (Wesley & Romero, 1969). 
History records that minimal education benefits for discharged veterans started shortly
after the turn of the 20th Century when in WWI some benefits were allowed for training
of skills (Fales, 2000). However, these benefits failed to become a reality as Congress,
because of the dawn of the depression, did not appropriate money for the program.
For a variety of reasons, World War II saw an upsurge on the part of government 
assistance to veterans after the war. This attitude prevailed despite the commander of one
veterans   organization testifying before congress that able-bodied veterans should not
receive any benefits from their country (Mason, 1999b). According to Mason, whose
history of the Veterans of Foreign Wars documents the support and nonsupport of the
emerging comprehensive package of veterans   benefits, the  Servicemen  s Readjustment
Act of 1944, one powerful representative opposed the act because it provided
unemployment benefits to veterans, and this representative believed that African
Americans would violate the spirit  of this provision and remain unemployed for the
duration of the benefit. Yet WWII saw the development of a comprehensive package of
veterans benefits. These benefits are contained in The Serviceman  s Readjustment Act of
27
1944, which has been hailed and referred to as the most significant legislation ever for
veterans (Bennett 1996). 
The Servicemen s Readjustment Act is a package of benefits unparalleled in
comparison to previous government efforts. This legislation contained benefits in the
areas of education, training, housing, and unemployment. Although the act became
known as the GI Bill of Rights, the education component of this bill became known as
the GI Bill. Serving as a benchmark for subsequent wars and conflicts, this bill enabled
millions of service men and women to attain a college education, obtain job training,
purchase homes, and obtain health care for military related injuries and illnesses.  
After World War II, Black veterans had mixed success in obtaining and using
veterans   benefits. According to research by Herbold (1994/1995) in The Journal of
Blacks in Higher Education, Blacks were denied unemployment more readily than
Whites because Blacks turned down the menial jobs offered them. Blacks also had a
harder time getting into colleges, although prerequisites such as a high school diploma
were waived for Whites. 
In summary, veterans have historically been promised and occasionally received
either an up-front bonus or post-service benefits for their sacrifices. The benefits have not
come easy, however, and have been overlaid with the national attitudes of serve and
return home, as well as antimilitarism. The United States has used a system of both
enlistment incentives and rewards for American soldiers, sailors,  marines, and air and
coast guardsmen and women. A guiding principle for post-service benefits in the U.S.
began when post- Revolutionary War Secretary of War, Henry Knox, the officer who
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began the Society of Cincinnati, wrote Congress, in a response to a pension request,
recommending that pensions must be tied directly to the service experience of the veteran
(Severo and Milford, 1988).
The Servicemen s Readjustment Act of 1944
Recalling the depression and widespread unemployment that occurred after World
War I,  when over 4 million soldiers and sailors were discharged within 18 months,
politicians began to consider ways in which perhaps triple that number of WWII veterans
would return to the economy. They had to arrive at some means to soften the economic
impact of another large group of warriors forced into an economy that was already
winding down its war production. Signed into law on June 22, 1944, the GI Bill offered,
among other benefits, education and training to any veteran with 90 or more days of
service. It provided benefits for World War II veterans for a period of 48 months
(compared to the 36 months of benefits for the present Montgomery GI Bill recipients)
(Celis, 1994). 
Yet, as powerful as this social legislation was later claimed to be, it is recorded in
the history of veterans organizations (Mason, 1999b) that the House committee that
forwarded this legislation did so completely against the will of its ranking member. After
a three-to-three vote in this committee, a second vote was scheduled to be taken the
following day. It was believed that, if an absent representative on vacation in Georgia
returned, he would cast the vote that would allow the GI Bill to move on to the full
House for vote. After a frantic search, the veterans   organizations located the vacationing
congressman and returned him to Washington, D.C. by 7:00 the next morning. This
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congressman words of support are recorded as follows:   I m here to lick anyone who
tries to hold up the GI bill of Rights. Americans are dying in Normandy. I m going to
expose anyone who doesn  t vote for the GI Bill   (Mason, 1999b, p. 110). President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed the Servicemen  s Readjustment Act of 1944 (S 1767)
into law on June 22, 1944. 
The VA sent GI Bill payments directly to the universities and colleges (Riesman,
1980). In his history of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Mason (1999b) records these
payments as $500 per year, an amount sufficient for an education and living expenses at
Harvard University. A monthly stipend of $50 for single soldiers and $65 for married
soldiers helped cover books and housing. Both stipends were later increased.
Implications of the GI Bill
According to many historians, the World War II GI Bill changed American 
society in a way that no previous or subsequent social legislation has done. Military
historian and author Herbert Molley Mason, Jr., (1999b) called the GI Bill   the most far-
reaching veterans legislation in U.S. history   (p. 111). The four primary components of
this law provided housing, health, unemployment benefits, and education benefits to
veterans returning from WWII. The education component is, however, credited with
much of the social change that occurred in America in the years following WWII.  
The GI Bill was controversial from its inception. Veterans were condemned as 
intellectually inferior, just as racial and ethnic groups and women were in earlier years.
The president of Stanford University was reported to have said that Italians were
genetically inferior, with the intellectual capacity of 12-year-olds and thus would not
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succeed in American universities and colleges (Severo & Milford, 1989). No larger an
academic figure than Robert Maynard Hutchins, president of the University of Chicago,
proclaimed, in Collier s magazine, that the GI Bill would precipitously lower college
standards (as cited in Haydock, n.d.). His statement that universities and colleges would
become   educational hobo jungles   proved to be highly inaccurate, as most GIs actually
contributed to the intellectual climate of the university (Mason,1999b). Mason also
recorded the comments of Harvard President James Conant, who initially opposed some
aspects of the bill, as saying that the GI s at Harvard were a   delight   for teachers
(p.112). According to Jackson (1994), Peter Drucker stated that the GI Bill initiated the
knowledge society  again, an incongruence with the idea that veterans were intellectual
inferiors. 
A distinguished Columbia University professor warned that veterans, returning
from a war that had substantively changed them, filling them in fact with anger, would
return and enter the campus with this anger (Haydock, n.d.). Congressman John Rankin
of Mississippi, chairman of the House Veterans Committee during the period of passage
of the GI Bill, adamantly opposed the education provisions of the bill claiming that
Blacks were unsuitable for higher education (Schmidt, 1994).
Yet the fears that veterans would ruin the campus were soon disproved as
veterans set about their academic duties with seriousness. Haydock (n.d.) cited a 1948
New York Times item wherein a professor was pleasantly surprised at the seriousness
and work ethic of veterans, saying that they were at the top of the honor rolls and deans 
lists.
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The influx of veterans to the campuses in the years following the war stimulated
many changes in higher education. The University of North Texas, Denton, is perhaps an
excellent case study of the manner in which the educational component of the GI Bill
affected higher education. Rogers (1965) offered the following changes to then North
Texas State Teacher s College:
1. Enrollment increased from 1,886 to 2,936 in 1 year, an increase of 64
percent. This increase was typical of university and college enrollment
around the U.S.
2. The university increased enrollment in 1946 to the point that there were
more men enrolled than women. This was the first time in the history of
the university that male students outnumbered female students.
3. A critical shortage in student housing for both single and married students
caused the university to turn away 1,000 prospective students in 1946.
Many of these turned-away students were veterans.
4. Expansion plans had to be developed nearly overnight. Not only was there
a shortage of student housing but an accompanying shortage of
classrooms, administration buildings, recreation facilities, and other
support real property.
5. Utility service became a severe problem, as the local government could
not provide the utilities necessary to support the increased numbers of
students, faculty, and administrators. The university actually became
involved in a utilities   war   with the city.
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6. The curriculum of the university expanded to include new subjects and
new degrees. Schools of music, business, and social sciences were quickly
added to the primary education curriculum.
7. A graduate school was initiated, along with emerging university research
programs to support the new graduate program. Business, government,
and private funds became available where none previously existed.
8. Student recreation programs and facilities were quickly developed to
support the burgeoning student body. A student union building became a
center of student leisure activities  no such facility previously existed.
9. The intercollegiate athletics program rapidly developed, and new sports
programs were added as student participation and interest increased.
10. Student government emerged as the older veteran students became
interested in having input into campus life.
11. The ratio of married students dramatically increased. New married-student
housing had to be added, along with other resources to support this new
student population.
12. Used buildings from military installations were soon  brought to the
campus to be used as housing, classrooms, laboratories, administration
offices, and recreation facilities. Building complexes that were used to
house students became know as Vet Villages  a term that became common
on campuses across the U.S.
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13. Faculty and staff shortages posed challenges to the administration. Besides
the general shortage of faculty and staff, many were able to move to other
job opportunities because of the shortage developed a salary bidding war.
14. The sudden expansion of student enrollment posed financial challenges to
the university. As budgets were exceeded, the university had to borrow
operating expenses from local banks. The delay in tuition payments from
the U.S. government also caused a shortage of operating cash.
15. Student housing began to shift from the campus to accommodations in the
local community. In this sense, the long-standing campus policy of in loco
parentis began to lose authority over students. Student independence from
campus authority hastened as the older veteran students became a
significant part of the student body.
The education portion of the GI Bill is credited with initiating, arousing, and
instilling in many citizens a desire for a college education. In 1940, for example, only
4.6% of the population had attained a college degree; in 1991 this figure was placed at
23.2 %, an increase partially attributable to attitudes stimulated by veterans and their GI
Bill (Celis, 1994). The World War II GI Bill led to the most educated generation in
American history (Jackson, 1994).
Thousands of African Americans have gained an education and some measure of
equality through all of the postwar GI Bills (Flake, 1998). Additionally,  other minorities 
and men and women from lower socioeconomic classes have been able to elevate their
standing through the GI Bills.
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The WWII GI Bill afforded an opportunity to many veterans who did not meet
tradition college admittance standards to attain a college education. Brown University
established a Veterans College that took in 486 veterans who failed to meet the admission
standards of other colleges and of Brown University itself (Olson, 1974). Some had not
yet, according to Olson, received their high school diplomas. Other universities and
colleges around the U.S. constructed similar, but to a lesser degree, alternative means of
admission for GI Bill veterans.
The GI Bill is linked to a significant growth in the number of community 
colleges. In 1943 the United States had 58 community colleges; in 1947 this number
reached 328 (Celis, 1994). According to a recent small study by an army education
officer, veteran attendance at community and junior colleges will again increase because
of the low value of the Montgomery GI Bill.
Some in society feared the mixing of mature GIs and young college students.
Prior to WWII, colleges were the home of the social elite.  Others feared the
overcrowding of colleges with ill-prepared students. By 1947 almost half of the students
attending college were veterans (West s Legal Directory, 1998). Some feared that most
veterans could not keep grade pace with the younger students.  In an anecdotal account,
Lienhard (n.d.) 
related, on behalf of  many young men and women on the campus of that time, that
veterans 10 years older than he were his academic equal.
Over 2.2 million WWII veterans attended college on the GI Bill (for a list of some
distinguished Americans who used the GI Bill see Appendix A). Since the end of the
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Gulf War, military forces have undergone a significant reduction in personnel. For
example, in 1997, the military end strength was expected to be at 1.4 million, down
700,000 from the 1988 figure of 2.1 million and continuing to decline. Thus, as the
services decrease and the number of GIs returning to society dwindles, the opportunity
for college attendance through military service will dramatically decline in the future.
Large numbers of veterans are not projected to enter the U.S. economy as they did in
WWII.
For all of its magnanimous contributions, the GI Bill began its historical run quite 
by accident (Jackson, 1994). The framers of the GI Bill suspected there was little interest
in attending college on the part of GIs. In spite of the early reservations of politicians and
academics, by 1947 over one half of the students enrolled in college were former service
members. This figure marked a significant increase in enrollment in American
universities and colleges. Expansion of facilities quickly became imperative because 
former GI s were sleeping and taking classes in hallways and gymnasiums.
Kenneth Ashworth, the long-time commissioner of higher education for the 
state of Texas, credited the World War II GI Bill legislation for contributing significantly 
and positively to American society. Ashworth (1979) summarized the research on the
implications and suggested the following: (a) the GI Bill prevented the unmanageable
introduction of millions of veterans into the job market after World War II; (b)
administrative introduction of the federal government into higher education as the
government developed, compiled, and provided lists of colleges and universities that
supported the GI Bill; (c) the introduction of education into new technologies that had
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been developed on campuses, used in war, and converted back to civilian use; (d) the
strengthening of the community and junior college system by creating the need for
vocational and technical training; (e) an increase in payment of income taxes, or tax
revenue,  as a result of entry of educated veterans into the job market; which more than
re-paid the costs to the government of the GI Bill.    
Payments for the GI Bill went directly to universities and colleges. Thus, although
the veterans did not enter the labor market directly, they did have an immediate impact
on the economy as campuses swelled beyond capacity and tuition  money soon expanded
campus coffers (Haydock, n.d.). The government poured money into campuses in other
ways. According to Haydock, new campuses arose from unneeded barracks on military
bases that were converted to civilian use. Moreover, the government fed the economy by
passing legislation that provided monies to campuses to build new facilities of every
type  dorms, academic offices, and classrooms. Syracuse University, where veterans
enrolled in high numbers after WWII, set up 175 trailers to house married students, 600
military-type wooden houses and one-story barracks for family housing, 22 barracks for
single veterans, 200 metal buildings for single veterans, metal houses for 100 veterans,
and 100 metal buildings for classrooms, laboratories, and offices (Syracuse University,
n.d.). Beyond the physical expansion, professors were in great demand and many new
ones were hired.
The postwar economy was aided in multiple ways. One, according to the Joint
Economic Committee of Congress, was that veterans who used the WWII GI Bill
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education component earned an average of $10,000 to $15,000 more per year than those
who did not (Herbold, 1994/1995).
The U.S. Census Bureau offered two important statistics regarding the GI Bill. In
testimony before Congress, the Noncommissioned Officer s Association, citing Census
Bureau data, indicated that WWII veterans increased their lifetime income by as much as
40% because of the GI Bill (Rhea, 1999). More importantly, however, is the figure that
the U.S. Treasury gets back two to eight times as much in revenue as was spent on the GI
Bill.
The Vietnam-era GI Bill appears not to have been as successful as previous 
versions of the bill. While comprehensive studies appear not to have been done,  
government officials, sociologists, and educators have speculated as to why Vietnam 
veterans did not use this benefit at the same rate as veterans of previous wars. It has been
suggested by some that this is so because (a) Vietnam War veterans were less mature 
after the war than were veterans of previous wars-- the average age of Vietnam veterans 
was 19, for World War II it was 27, and for Korea, 23; and, (b) Vietnam veterans did not
receive the extensive postwar or demobilization counseling that veterans received in prior
wars. In 1971 the chair of the President s Committee on Employment of the Handicapped
indicated that disabled Vietnam veterans were not   flocking back to school the way their
fathers did after World War II and even the Korean War.   In fact, overall usage of the
college benefit portion of the Vietnam GI Bill was so low that the Office of Economic
Opportunity  initiated a program, with 1 million dollars to expend, to pay enrolled
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Vietnam veterans to recruit nonenrolled veterans to the college campus. In 1972, the
American Legion, on behalf of veterans and in the belief that use of the GI Bill 
was low because of its monetary worth, asked Congress to pay a supplemental allowance 
to help GIs with tuition, books, and fees (Rumer, 1990). 
The Montgomery GI Bill was enacted in July 1984. It was named after its primary 
sponsor, Representative G. V. Montgomery of Mississippi. The bill replaced the previous
brief program called Veterans Education Assistance Program, or VEAP, and  requires the
soldier, sailor, airman, or marine to for the first time to contribute $1,200 toward the bill
(Montgomery GI Bill, 1997).
The Department of Veterans Administration estimates that 20.7 million American
veterans have benefitted from the WWII, Korean War and Vietnam War era GI Bills
(Department of Veterans Affairs, n.d.b). Yet, all of the implications are not in, studies
continue to discover new ways in which this legislation has contributed to U.S. society.
Purposes of the GI Bill
Is the GI Bill a recruiting tool, a reward for Americans who served their country,
or a program designed to soften the impact of the numbers of discharged soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines reentering the economy each year? The armed services seem to have
designed programs to meet both of these demands. Presently, according to the department
of defense statistics, 65% of all graduating high school students are entering college, up
from 45% 10 years ago. Thus, potential recruits are bombarded with several different
types of GI Bill educational programs that cater to the population ready to attend college.
Representative John D. Dingel suggested in a column in a service magazine that an
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improved GI Bill would solve all of the services   recruiting problems. Titled   Potential
Recruits Do Not See the GI Bill as an Adequate Educational Benefit Package   his
column  states that the current GI Bill covers only 36 % of the cost of a 4-year education,
whereas the WWII GI Bill provided the same education free to veterans (Dingel, 1999, p.
62).
The current GI Bill, the Montgomery GI Bill, is primarily an inducement to
enlistment, but, it is also considered a minor reward for service. During the colonial era
the colonies started a trend of offering preenlistment incentives that has become
ingrained in our processes of inducing men and women to serve in the militia and regular
armed forces. Government has used land grants, bounties, clothing, and cash incentives
for services rendered. Such inducements to service were often paid upon presentation of 
evidence of service  including the scalp of Native Americans during the wars between
Americans and Native Americans (Ferling, 1985).
Recent news magazines have reported the results of a military financial study that
recommends less emphasis on recruiting ads that feature college funding. The general
rise in the economy results in more parental dollars available for college, and, as the
government amasses greater surpluses, more money is available for loans and grants. The
article indicates that the Pentagon should concentrate more on building a corporate
identity that will inspire young people to join a successful organization.
The Commission on Servicemembers and Veterans Transition Assistance
suggests two negative effects of a less than viable GI Bill (  Bipartisan Panel  , 1999).
40
Morale and retention, both said to be low in the active and reserve forces, according to





Scientific research is divided into two categories: (a) basic and (b) applied. In
describing these two categories, Clover and Balsley (1984) posited the differences in the
two research classifications as follows: (a) basic research seeks to extend knowledge,
whereas (b) applied research solves problems. Basic research is foundational research
that often leads to or is manifested in applied research (Schoenfeld, 1999).   Historical
research, a submethodology of basic research, aids in both (a) the clarification of issues
and (b) the basis or essence for decision making (Travers, 1978).   
General Overview of Historical Research
Historical research studies often include an application of the descriptive
analytical approach. Best and Kahn (1986) have indicated that this method of study of an
issue involves the processes of    investigating, recording, analyzing, and interpreting the
events of the past for the purpose of discovering generalizations that are helpful in
understanding the past and present, and, to a limited extent, in anticipation of the future 
(p.24). Gottschalk (1961) described the process of historical study as a process that
critically examines and analyzes an issue through the use of records, reports, earlier
writings, logs, and other recorded data, some contemporary, some later. Borg and Gall
(1989) affirmed that historical research is a systematic examination of the past for facts, a
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relating of those facts to current data, and the drawing of conclusions. The discovery of
facts and the subsequent juxtaposition of the past and the present to determine important
aspects of both to society--in the present study, the past and present purposes and
economic value of the GI Bill-- enable a systematic examination and a foundation for
conclusions. 
Purposes of Historical Research
Borg and Gall (1989) suggested three important purposes of historical research in
education. They noted that the intention of historical research is (a) to acquire knowledge
from past events and activities, (b) to isolate and pinpoint areas requiring educational
reform, and (c) to build a foundation from which future trends may be predicted from
past occurrences. The historical method, after a careful examination of the past,
  provides information that aids in making educational decisions   (Wiersma, 1991,
p.290). Travers (1978) indicates that   valid generalizations   may be   derived   from
historical research   data   and that historical research that leads to generalizations is
important research (p.10). Sherman (1984) stipulated that historical research that includes
a study of relationships may lead to the development of concepts.
Levels of Historical Research Data
Historical research of documents, books, maps, dairies, and other such materials
can be tested for their level of relevance and application by determining whether they are
primary or secondary sources (Borg & Gall, 1989; Travers, 1978; Wiersma, 1991). These
levels of relevance and application aid the researcher in judging the relevance and
application of the research materials.
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Focus and Intent of Historical Research
Historical research generally focuses on five areas of inquiry. These five points of
concentration are (a) current issues, (b) individuals and their behavior, (c) interpretation
of existing data, (d) reinterpretation of such data, and (e) the synthesis or merging of
existing data to draw new conclusions (Borg & Gall, 1989; Clover & Balsley, 1984;
Travers, 1978; Wiersma, 1969). As stipulated above, Schoenfeld  s (1999) model of the
entire research process originates with basic, or, in the present case, historical research.
Travers (1978) states that historical research may lead to a   valid generalization derived
from data   of a historical nature (p.8). Borg and Gall were more precise in expounding
that historical research can lead to mature generalizations. 
Procedures
Historical research is presented in one of three methods: (a) chronological, (b)
thematic, and (c) a combination of chronological and thematic (Borg & Gall, 1989).
Outlining some accepted processes of historical research, Wiersma (1991) stated that
directed library research is an acceptable means of acquiring historical data (other
techniques of data collection and examination might include oral histories, surveys of
primary participants in an event, etc. According to Clover & Balsley (1984) library
research is necessary for most historical research processes. Further, these researchers
suggested that this library research is best employed in chronological narrative study.
Evaluating Sources and Data
Historical data involve two aspects for evaluating data: (a) external criticism and
(b) internal criticism (Wiersma, 1991). External criticism involves examination, testing,
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and authenticating documents. According to Borg and Gall (1989), this process ensures
that the authenticity of original documents is unquestioned. In describing the second
aspect of evaluation, internal criticism, Wiersma denoted a process that establishes the
accuracy, intended meaning and correct application of the originally intended meaning.
Borg and Gall added to this latter point in stating that internal criticism  imposes these
evaluative conditions: (a) accuracy; (b) worth, and (c) relevance of the data to the study. 
The researchers noted above have urged those using the historical research
method to  develop a set of questions to apply to and evaluate the data. The efficacy of a
study is ensured as a result of the application of these questions to each piece or set of
data.
Current Study Research Plan, Design, and Process
As noted in the Purpose of the Study, the two issues were examined using the
basic research technique, specifically, the historical research method. This method
advances the purpose of the study by focusing on the issues of (a) the historical purposes
of the GI Bill and (b) the economic value of the GI Bill to the individual. 
The process applied in this historical research study was a combination of the
chronological and thematic process and followed these specific steps: (a) surveying
veterans   benefits chronologically across time and nations to arrive at an understanding
of the historical development of veterans   benefits, (b) thematically  reviewing the
Servicemen s Readjustment Act of 1944 to determine the purposes and individual
economic value of the model GI Bill, (c) examining current studies and activities
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regarding the present GI Bill, and (d) presenting a comparative analysis of the purposes
and value of the first and current GI Bills.
Specifically, the researcher used library and Internet resources to (a) examine the
origins of benefits for U.S. veterans;  (b) review writings about the initiation,
implementation, and social implications of the most significant item of veterans 
legislation in U.S. history, the Servicemen s Readjustment Act of 1944; and (c) survey
and examine the purposes and economic value to the veteran of a primary feature of this
legislation, the educational component. This process of examination and survey of
historical studies, writings, and data resulted in conclusions concerning the two primary
research questions.
In the present study, historical  research is important to building a foundation for
new knowledge regarding the purposes and economic value of the current GI Bill.
Historical knowledge is valuable because it provides a basis for guiding national leaders
in the development of national policies governing benefit programs for veterans. In the
current study, examining the value of the GI Bill over the years will aid in understanding
the purpose for a GI Bill and its economic  value to veterans. 
The researcher made extensive use of library resources at the University of North
Texas, Internet resources, and periodicals universal to a military audience to examine the
research questions under study. Where and when available, primary studies and writings
were used. In the absence of the availability of primary sources however, secondary
resources referencing, analyzing, and summarizing studies and data were also used.
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CHAPTER 4
COLLEGE COSTS AND THE VALUE OF THE  GI BILLS
College Tuition Since WWII
There are many studies, figures, and statistics, as well as much anecdotal
information regarding the rise in college tuition since WWII. For instance, the
Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA), before a 1997 congressionally-chartered
Commission on Servicemembers and Veterans Transition Assistance, reported that since
the date of the 1985 inception of the Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB) college tuition has
increased 100%,  whereas the Montgomery GI Bill has shown a 42% increase
(Commission, 1997). Tuition costs do not include living expenses. At this same meeting,
the DVA reported that, in 1993, the MGIB had a 29% usage rate.
In the 1998-1999 college year, according to the College Board, the average yearly
tuition and fees at a 2-year public college were $1,633. The same cost at a 4-year public
university was $3,343 and $14, 508 for a private 4-year college (College Board, 1998).
These figures do not include living costs. The current MGIB annual payment of $4,482
leaves $1,481 remaining for living expenses at a public 4-year university. At the private
college tuition rate, the MGIB would fall short of tuition by $10,026 with no living
expenses.
In testimony before the House Veterans Committee, the Noncommissioned
Officers Association, in order to show the relationship between the steep rise in college
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tuition and immoderate rises in the Montgomery GI Bill payment amount, indicated that
the 1985 MGIB has increased 40%, whereas college costs had increased 230% over the
same period of time (Rhea, 1999). As a result, the association suggested, this GI Bill has
the lowest utilization rate of any of the three previous GI Bills. 
According to the Department of Education (2000), the increase in university and
college costs may, in part, be the result of the availability of loans, scholarships, and
other funding. Stated in another manner, costs increase because of the availability of
programs that assist students in paying college tuition expenses.  Moreover, the dollar
today buys considerably more in a 4-year education; computers and other technology
have leveraged the process of education. Although recommending increases in numerous
federal funding programs, such as Pell Grants, work study, and others in its testimony
before Congress, the Department of Education did not recommend an increase in the
Montgomery GI bill. 
College tuition increases, as can be seen from the above commentary, have
limited the value of the present GI Bill, the MGIB. In this context, it is worthwhile to
examine the specific purpose and economic value of each GI Bill.
WWII GI Bill
The first GI Bill of Rights, officially the Servicemen  s Readjustment Act of 1944,
was passed on June 22, 1944. Public Law 346 awarded up to 48 months of education and
training benefits to any service member with over 90 days of service (Haydock, n.d.).
The maximum of 48 months was based on 1 month of education for each month of
service beyond the basic benefit of 1 year for 90 days of service. Therefore, 48 months of
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education benefits required 90 days plus 3 years of service--a typical service period for
veterans of WWII. 
The World War II GI Bill essentially paid full college tuition and living expenses
(see Table 1). It paid $500 per year in tuition, a $75 and $105-per month living allowance
for singles and marrieds, respectively. Scholastic publications, print media, and personal
communications are replete with anecdotes indicating that the WWII GI Bill substantially
covered costs of a higher education degree.
The payments for veterans attending universities and colleges across the country
were sent directly to the university or college. Beginning with the Korean War-era GI
Bill, payments were sent to the individual rather than to universities and colleges
(Reisman, 1990). The reason for this change had to do, primarily, with the rising rates of
tuition, which congressional committees, in hearings before passage of the Korean War
GI Bill, attributed to this direct method of payment to universities and colleges
(Committee on Veterans Affairs, 1973).
The WWII GI Bill did not require a financial contribution from the veteran.
Without any financial contribution, every veteran who met the 90-day service time
requirement met the basic eligibility requirement.
According to a study by the Department of Veterans Affairs (n.d.b) on the GI Bill,
2,230,00 veterans attended college under the WWII GI Bill. Training courses, an
alternative to college, were attended by 5,570,000 veterans. These large numbers are
considered a measure of the viability and effectiveness of the bill. 
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Writing for the Carnegie Foundation, Riesman (1980) concluded that the WWII
GI Bill enabled veterans to attend and graduate from the nation  s most prestigious
universities and colleges, regardless of tuition costs and living expenses. Moreover,
Riesman suggested that the universities and colleges of today essentially owe their
growth, popularity, and other measures of success to the GI Bill of WWII.
Korean War GI Bill
Public Law 550, the Veterans Assistance Act 1952, for Korean War veterans,
contained an educational component, as well as the home, farm, and business loan
programs, and other benefits similar to the WWII GI Bill (Department of Veterans
Affairs, 2000). The most significant change in this GI Bill was that payments were made
directly to the veteran. In hearings regarding the passage of the Korean War GI Bill,
Congress learned of fraud on the part of some universities colleges during the WWII GI
Bill education period (Committee on Veterans Affairs, 1973). In another contrast to the
WWII GI Bill, stipends, or living expenses were not offered (see Table 1). The
Department of Veterans Affairs numbers indicate that half the number of WWII  veterans
attended college under this program  1,213,000. Another 1,178,000 attended training.
The Korean War GI Bill paid $110 a month for 36 months. This number of
months of education was 12 months less than the WWII GI Bill. Forty-three percent of
Korean War veterans used their educational benefits   a little over 40% of this number
were able to attend private colleges (Mason, 1999b).
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Vietnam War GI Bill
The Vietnam War GI Bill was codified in Public Law 89-358, the Veterans
Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966 (United States Statutes at Large, 1966). This bill had
a unique feature; it allowed active duty personnel to receive benefits. Previous GI Bills
did not provide educational assistance to GIs on active duty. Additionally,  unlike the
WWII and Korean War bills, the Vietnam-era GI Bill required a minimum of 180 days of
service rather than the previous 90 days. For full benefits, however, the veteran had to
serve a full 36 months (Mason, 1999a).
The Vietnam-era GI Bill offered a basic starting benefit of $100 a month,
eventually increasing, over a 17-year period, to $376, for 36 months (see Table 1). The
Department of Veterans Affairs (n.d.b) history indicated that 5.1 million veterans
attended college using this benefit, while another 3,147,000 entered training courses.
Although this number seems large, veterans struggled for most of these years as college
and living expenses began a rapid and steep rise.
According to Mason (1999a), the number of Korean War and Vietnam War
veterans in private colleges declined with each of these wars. Whereas in 1947, 59% of
the Harvard student body was made up of veterans, in 1972, they accounted for only
1.5% of the students (Department of Veterans Affairs, n.d.b).
 Veterans   organizations became concerned when Veterans Affairs records of
1969 showed that only 25% of eligible Vietnam veterans were able to attend college on
the Vietnam GI Bill (Mason, 1999a). The American Legion, in the early 1970s, lobbied
Congress for a supplementary benefit for GIs attempting to attend or already enrolled in
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college. This veterans   organization suggested that over one half of the veterans of the
Vietnam War would not be able to attend college because of the low education payment
and the high cost of college. By comparison, the American Legion offered evidence that,
when states granted free tuition to such veterans, the college attendance rate was much
higher (Rumer, 1990). 
The Vietnam-era GI Bill substantially began the decline in the ability of a veteran
to attend and pay for college using the GI Bill. The rise in tuition and living expenses was
beginning to affect the value of the bill.
The Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB)
Public Law 98-525 provides education benefits to service members in service
before, during, and after the Persian Gulf War (United States Statutes at Large, 1984).
According to the official history of the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Montgomery
GI Bill, named after Mississippi Representative G. V.   Sonny   Montgomery, became the
first GI Bill designed to focus on the recruiting efforts of the military services,
specifically the All-Volunteer Force. Also, this is the first GI Bill to require the soldier to
make a financial contribution to the program (besides the failed Veterans Education
Assistance Program, a contributory program in effect in the early 1980s). This shift in
focus, a recruiting incentive and a financial contribution from the soldier, may have
altered U.S. national  attitudes toward funding GI Bills.
The Montgomery GI Bill requires a minimum of 2 years of service before benefits
can be claimed. This time-of-service requirement substantially contrasts with the 90-day
service time for the WWII and Korean War GI Bills and the 180-day, later 36-month
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requirement of the Vietnam War. The payment benefit varies according to years of
service, with the top benefit being $536 per month, 9 months per year, for 36 total
months of benefit (Department of Veterans Affairs, n.d.a).
The MGIB, according to several prominent military experts, is not fulfilling its
goal of serving as a recruiting incentive for the All-Volunteer Force. Because the basic
MGIB is an ineffectual recruiting incentive to attract young men and women to the
services (Moskos, 2000), an added bonus, slightly different across the services, attempts
to entice high-quality recruits. These payments range from $25,000 to $50,000, 
depending on enlistment years and military occupational specialties. This program is
aimed at few recruits  in fact, it is a program not available to most enlistees.
The Montgomery GI Bill, unlike its predecessors, requires a nonrefundable $100
per month for 12 months contribution from service personnel (Department of Veterans
Affairs, 1998). This contribution comes at the low end of the servicemenbers  pay scale.
The magnitude of this contribution is seen in a time when, as Pierce (2000) has suggested
in an article about food stamps in the military, poverty pervades the lower ranks of the
military pay structure.  In several studies cited by Pierce, (a) almost three fourths of the
entire military force makes less than $30,000 per year; (b) 3% of military personnel are
eligible for food stamps, while approximately 17,000 miliary personnel, or about 1%,
actually  draw food stamps; (c) in one county surrounding Fort Stewart, Georgia, 30% of
food stamps are issued to military personnel; and (d) the current military-civilian pay gap
is 13% and by 2000 was projected to be 20 percent. Thus, the timing of the requirement
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for a $1,200 MGIB contribution comes at a time of low pay, definitely not a time
advantageous to the soldier seeking the GI Bill.
In outlining some of the problems with the MGIB, Kime (1997) noted that the
veteran cannot maximize the MGIB by attending an above-average tuition public or
private 2-year institution or by enrolling in a 1- or 2-year training or vocational program,
because only  9 payments can be received in a 1-year enrollment, with 18 payments for a
2-year enrollment. In the case of the 1-year program, the student would lose the
remaining 27 payments, and in a 2-year program, the remaining 18 payments. Payments
from the MGIB cannot be accelerated. Moreover, a veteran who acquires education
during service for the purpose of using the GI Bill for the last 2 years of tuition or even
graduate school would receive only the 18 payments  not being able to acquire the full
benefit in order to attend a high-cost public or prestigious private university. In this case
the soldier would be penalized for attending college before or during military service.
Should a veteran find college not a viable option after service, then the paid-in
amount of $1,200 is forfeited.  Further, should the veteran not use the paid-for and earned
benefit within a 10-year period, the 36-month benefit is voided, along with the
contribution.
The downsizing of the military, which began in 1990, will not be returning the
large numbers of soldiers to the U.S. economy that it did after WWII, and to a lesser
degree after Korea and Vietnam. According to a report to the president by the secretary
of defense, the military services are at their lowest strength since WWII (  Military
Downsizing,   2000). These numbers do not portend the economic situation that occurred
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after previous wars. Therefore, there  may be less interest on the part of government
officials to ensure that the GI Bill is sufficient to keep the small number of veterans in
college and out of the economy. 
The services are having difficulty meeting their recruiting goals. The
Noncommissioned Officers Association, in testimony before the House Veterans
Committee (Rhea, 1999), related that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have consistently believed,
despite contrary information pointed out by Moskos, Williams, and Segal (2000) and
others,  that reform of the Montgomery GI Bill is critical if the services are to meet their
recruiting goals. Many military experts do not believe that the present GI Bill is an
effective recruiting tool.
The MGIB does not provide, like the Korean and Vietnam War GI Bills, a stipend
to supplement living costs while the veterans attend college (see Table 1). The WWII GI
Bill authorized a stipend each month that greatly assisted veterans with their living
expense and, in some cases, covered all of a veterans living expenses. 
Figures for MGIB use by veterans range in the high 30% to the low 40 percent.
The Noncommissioned Officers Association (Rhea, 1999) suggested that this is so
because the MGIB covers only about 40% of the cost of a 4-year education. In concert
with Moskos et al (2000), this organization suggested that the benefit generally does not
inspire enlistments. Moskos and Butler (1996) went further in demonstrating that 37% of
Whites enlisting in the services indicate a lack of interest in the GI Bill  s educational
benefits, whereas 51% of Blacks indicate that the educational benefits of the MGIB are
important as an enlistment incentive. The average would indicate that, for fewer than half
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of all recruits, the MGIB educational benefit is not important to their enlistment reasons.
Binkin and  Eitelberg (1982) previously suggested the same in that they declared that
Blacks were more likely than Whites to join the service because of the educational
benefits. However, Binkin and Eitelber also suggested that the GI Bill does not seem to
be a primary reason for service enlistment. (Binkin and Eitelberg have noted that the
MGIB total payment amount is purposely kept low so as to keep large numbers of Blacks
from enlisting in the armed forces for educational benefits.)  
Specific Economic Value of the MGIB 
The New York Times, in a 50th anniversary review of the GI Bill, editorialized 
that   today the legislation has lost much of its economic impact and, as a result, much of
its appeal to veterans (Celis, 1994, p. A20). Moskos et al. (2000) indicated that this is so
because there is a substantial amount of federal and state tuition aid available to
prospective students without their signing up for any federal service.
Currently, it is estimated that only about 40% of veterans eligible for the 
Montgomery GI Bill use their benefits (Rhea, 1999). In fact, the House, as noted earlier, 
estimates that the original Montgomery GI Bill of $300, if it had retained its original 
value, would be set at $800 presently. 
The MGIB, after a $1,200 contribution by the service member, 9 months a
calendar year, now provides $535 a month for up to 36 months, for a total benefit of
$18,096 (minus the $1,200 contribution of the service member). The College Board
figure indicated earlier, of tuition and fees costing $3,243 per school year, or $12,972 for 
a 4-year degree, leaves a difference of $4, 836 for 4 years of room and board, or $1,209
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per school year. The average cost of room and board at a public university varies so
greatly that it is difficult to establish a useable figure  suffice it to say that an amount just
over $1,000 is an insufficient living expense. The gulf for a private 4-year education is
much wider. The $58,032 per 4-year degree at a private university or college, with the GI
Bill paying $17,808, leaves a deficit of $40,224, room and board not considered. 
The Congressional Commission on Servicemenbers and Veterans Transition
Assistance, in a hearing before the House Committee on Veterans Affairs (1999)
recommended to Congress that the $1,200 contribution by service members be
eliminated.  This payment, put into effect at a time of high budget deficits, no longer
served a useful purpose, indicated the chairman of the commission. Moreover, the
commission suggested that this payment seems a hindrance to the marketing of the
MGIB. 
Further demonstration of the low value of the MGIB can be seen in a study by
Adimaro, an army education officer at Fort Dix, New Jersey. In a limited qualitative
study in 1999, Adimaro found that 63 % of veterans used the Montgomery GI Bill to
pursue a 2-year degree. The major conclusion of this study is that GIs cannot afford the
more expensive bachelor s degrees, especially at private colleges (Ledford, 1999).
Appearing before a 1997 meeting of the Commission on Servicemembers and Veterans
Transition Assistance, a DVA representative stated that a large number of MGIB users
are attending community and junior colleges (Commission, 1997). This evidence seems
to indicate that the MGIB is insufficient for many veterans to attend 4-year universities
and colleges.
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The $1,200 contribution, which Congress in several committee hearings
suggested should  go to $1,500 or even higher, was not a requirement for previous GI
Bills. This affects service members via their monthly pay. Presently, as many as 8,600
service men and women are drawing food stamps. This figure could be even higher
because there are, according to Pierce (2000), many more service personnel eligible for
food assistance who do not draw such assistance because of pride. Although this figure is
down from the 
11, 600 on food stamps in 1995, this number does seem to affect the desirability of
paying for the GI Bill at a time when it is least affordable (Pierce, 2000). Many new
service men and women are married upon entering service; thus, the required financial
contributions before they can receive the GI Bill comes at a difficult financial time. The
fact that these payments come out of the checks of GIs when they are at their lowest pay
scale causes service men and women to drop out of the GI Bill program. Currently
137,000 active duty service men and women do not have any education benefits, having
dropped the benefit soon after entering service (Pierce, 2000).
Because of the low payment of the Montgomery GI Bill, veterans are essentially
eliminated from two forms of education: (a) private universities, where the average
tuition and fees, according the Department of Education (2000) are $15,380 per year;
and, (b) out-of-state universities and colleges, because the tuition rate for nonresidents is
triple or even quadruple the cost of tuition and fees for state residents..
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Three times in FY 1999, a Senate bill to raise GI Bill payments failed to muster
agreement with the House of Representatives. The latest effort by the Senate would have
increased GI Bill payments by 13.6 percent.
The current MGIB payment of $536 has only been in existence a mere 2 years of
the 15 year period of the benefit. The benefit began for many soldiers at a payment of
$300. At that rate, it is reported that usage was below 25 percent.
Table 1
Economic Value of GI Bills
_______________________________________________________________________
War era        Pub law no.      Monthly         Stipend   1 year          Tuitiona        %b
                                          Payments/mos                     Amount      State univ     Tuition      
                                                                                                        Covered
WWII PL 346      $500c
    48mos
  $90d
  $1080
 $1580      $400  100%+
Korea PL 550       $110
     36mos
   None   $990      $275   51%
Vietnam PL 358  $100-$376
     36mos
   None  $2142      $635    40%
Persian
Gulf
 PL 98-   
525
      $536f    None  $4824     $8,774e    40%
Notes:
aAnnual tuition, not counting summer, not including living expenses. bPercentage of
tuition, does not include any living expenses. cAnnual rather than monthly payment. dAn
average of single and married veterans. Paid per month. eObtained from AFSA (Staton,
2000) citing The College Board Data. fThe MGIB requires a $1,200 contribution from the
veteran.
Current GI Bill Studies, Recommendations, and Congressional Actions
On February 13, 1997, U.S. Representative Bob Filner introduced H.R. 759 to 
increase by 10%  the present version of the GI Bill. In an interview reported in a current 
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veterans magazine, Representative Filner commented that the large increases in college
tuition have resulted in the MGIB covering only 39% of the total cost of a college
education (  Bill Would Boost,   1997). The representative went on to say that Congress
should soon conduct hearings to arrive at a more satisfactory MGIB payment rate to
assist veterans with their education after service. 
Today s Montgomery GI Bill has clearly not kept pace with rapid increases in
tuition. Congress now has two bills that will restore economic viability to this situation.
The House of Representatives resolution, H.R.4334 (Appendix G) the Senate bill, S.
2419 (Appendix H) are calling for a MGIB that provides payment at the rate of a public
commuter university.
For a recent congressional committee hearing, the DVA reported that only 10-
20% of Vietnam-era soldiers were married, whereas 68% of all separating soldiers of
today are married (House Veterans Affairs Committee, 1999). Only 40% of these
separating married soldiers are eligible for the MGIB  usage of the GI Bill is lowest
among married veterans. This same committee background report indicated that college
tuition rates have increased so substantially since the MGIB went into effect in 1985 that
it is difficult for married veterans to pursue an education using the MGIB. The report 
indicated that in 1996, tuition, room and board, fees, books, and transportation at a public
institution were $10,759, with $20,003 for private institutions. The shortfall between the
GI Bill and public institutions is $6,007 for a 9-month school year and for the private
university or college in the same period, a shortfall of $15,251, based on a 1997 MGIB
annual payment of $4,753. Moreover, the  MGIB usage rate of 48.7% for a 13-year
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period is considerably lower than the first 10 years   usage rate of the Vietnam- era GI
Bill, 63.6 percent. Even though this report is 2 to 3 years old, it demonstrates the ongoing
problems that veterans are having with the current GI Bill.
 Without citing a particular study, Representative Lane Evans, the ranking
Democratic member of the House Veteran s Affairs Committee, has charged that the
low-funded Montgomery GI Bill is the reason for the military s recruiting problems.
Quoted recently in a service magazine, the representative said,   College costs have
quadrupled  the last 20 years while the basic GI Bill benefit has increased 76 percent
since 1986 (FastTrack, 1999a, p. 6 ).   Georgia Senator Max Cleland, the former
Secretary of the Veterans Administration, when asked on November 2, 1999, if he would
continue to push for an increase in the GI Bill said,   I  ll be back again,   to try to increase
GI Bill educational benefits (FastTrack, 2000, p. 6). Some other representatives and
senators continue to express concern about the low rate of payment of the MGIB, yet
studies persist.
On the opposite side of this issue, Representative Neil Abercrombie worries that
the military services and the nation have gone too far in providing generous college
benefits to military personnel. He has suggested that the reenlistment rate of those
presently in the service is down because service members leave to use their GI Bill
(FastTrack, 2000).
The veterans  organizations continue every effort to inspire Congress to elevate
the educational benefit offered by the GI Bill. In 1997 the major veterans organizations,
appearing before the Commission on Servicemenbers and Veterans Transition
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Assistance, a congressionally-charged inquiry committee, urged this committee to raise
the GI Bill to WWII levels in order to ease the transition of veterans to civilian life
(Commission, 1997). More recently, 47 veterans  organizations, military service
organizations, and education organizations have coalesced in The Partnership for
Veterans Education: Fulfilling America s Promise. Their goal is to raise the GI Bill
payment from the current $536 to $975 per month (Washington Wire, 2000).
More specifically, in an open letter to all U.S. senators and representatives, these
U.S. veterans  organizations and associations of higher education call for Congress
immediately to pass legislation that would grant veterans a monthly benefit of $975
(presently the benefit is $536) for a total payment of $35,100 (presently the benefit is
$19,296, not deducting the $1,200 contribution) (Staton, 2000). This recommended grant
is based on the College Board s estimate of annual tuition at a public commuter college.
The coalition justifies their proposal on these points: (a) The current MGIB benefit does
not cover the cost of a 4-year degree; (b) the MGIB no longer serves as an effective
enlistment incentive; and  (c) the MGIB no longer serves as an effective tool for
readjustment from military to civilian life. Essentially, the veterans   and higher education
organizations are calling for complete parity between today s GI Bill and that of World
War II.     
Going even further than parity, Helping Our Processionals Educationally Act, S
2402, introduced by Senator Max Cleland, expects to transfer the paid-up GI Bill benefit
to a family member if the service man or woman plans to make the military a career
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(Newslines, 2000). Although a similar bill was passed in committee 1999, the bill was
not accepted into final legislation by the House of Representatives.  
The Veterans and Dependents Millennium Education Act of 2000 proposes to
raise the GI Bill payment by 36 percent. However, this bill would require those who were
forced to drop their GI Bill at a time of low pay, the 137,000 number earlier noted,  to
now pay an enrollment fee of $2,700 to acquire GI Bill benefits. The latest Senate bill
would raise the GI Bill payment to $600 on October 1, 2000, and to $700 on October 1,
2002.
Summary of Purpose
The GI Bills of WWII, the Korean War and the Vietnam War, and to a minor
extent, the Montgomery GI Bill, were offered as a  benefit to veterans as a readjustment
tool, for service time that took away their primary educational and working years. There
are primary differences beyond this assertion, however. The WWII GI Bill was, in
addition to being a veterans   readjustment aid, was also a tool for adjusting the U.S.
economy to the sudden influx of workers, whereas the current Montgomery GI Bill is
primarily a recruiting incentive (Whitman, n.d.).
Specifically, the GI Bill of WWII had the  primary purpose of minimizing the
impact of 16 million veterans returning to the economy  (Department of Veterans Affairs,
n.d.a). This is borne out in the bill introduction, where it is indicated that the act is
intended for the good of the U.S. economy (United States Statutes at Large, 1944, p.
284). The end of WWII saw an economy that already had large unemployment because
of the reduction and shutdown of war-oriented industry  an economy that could not
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absorb both laid-off war industry workers and returning soldiers. The Korean War had
fewer soldiers involved, and it did not have the large war industry that was necessary
during WWII. The Vietnam War, a war that was fought by a 1-year rotation method,
similarly did not return large numbers of soldiers to the economy. The Persian Gulf War,
fought by professional active and reserve forces, had a small number of soldiers returning
to the economy  most returned to their stateside posts, while reservists returned to their
civilian employment.
In summary, the wording of the Korean War GI Bill indicated that the bill was
intended primarily to assist veterans in their readjustment to society (United States
Statues at Large, 1952).  The Vietnam-era GI Bill was the first to indicate that the
foremost intent of the bill was   enhancing and making more attractive service in the
Armed Forces of the United States   (United States Statutes at Large, 1996, p. 12). The
Montgomery GI Bill lists as one of its objectives,   To promote and assist the All-
Volunteer Force program   (United States Statutes at Large, 1984). Thus, the WWII GI
Bill is alone in mentioning an intended effect on the U.S. economy.
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CHAPTER 5
RESEARCH QUESTIONS, SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS,
IMPLICATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
The fighting of war throughout history, as so succinctly, and perhaps even in
gross 
understatement, was best described by General Philip Sheridan as   hell   (Hirsohon,
1997, p. 2). To entice men and women into entering this realm, governments and nations
have offered inducements above and beyond any given ordinary nonserving citizens.
Moreover, at certain times in history, the authority conducting the war had to be forced,
through citizen action, to care for the veterans of the war. In the United States, fighters
not only suffered countless indignities during the wars and conflicts for which they
volunteered or were conscripted,  but they also suffered after the war or conflict. Blamed
for all manner of social ills, such as crime increases and drug abuse, and labeled lazy and
dangerous, U.S. veterans have encountered extreme difficulty in gaining the benefits they
believed were earned as a result of their service to their country. 
The American veteran, from colonial times to the present, has received both scorn
and high recognition from U.S. society and government. Yet the Vietnam veteran, who
was spat upon and called a   baby killer   by some Americans,  has also been recognized,
along with all U.S. veterans of the 20th century, by a joint resolution of Congress as the
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 Person of the Century   (Concurrent Resolution, 2000). In light of this latter recognition,
it is difficult to imagine that one of the most important and deserved veterans   benefits of
the 20th century, the educational component of the GI Bill, is presently lagging in value
and flexibility, especially when compared to the bill of WWII. 
Currently, GIs must donate $!00 each month of their 1st  through 12th month of
service to acquire the GI Bill upon discharge. This, despite the fact that almost 13 % of
the soldiers are receiving benefits including Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), food
stamps, Medicaid, and state child care assistance (Frontlines, 2000). No previous GI Bill
required a financial contribution from the veteran.
College costs will continue to increase. The estimates for 2006 are that tuition, 
books, and room and board will be  $87,000 for a public college and $185,000 for a
private college (Hall & Herman, 1997). According to many senators and representatives
and chairs of the various armed services and veterans  committees, Congress is  not able
to provide the monies necessary for a raise in GI Bill payments. One such representative,
Bob Strump, chairman of the House Veterans Committee, stated that he is working
toward GI Bill monthly benefits that fully fund the cost of tuition, books, and fees, and
provide a monthly stipend of $800 per month. Yet, several such bills have been
introduced into Congress the last few years (see the latest versions at Appendixes G and
H).
A commission established by Congress in October, 1996, began work on April
25, 1997, to inquire into benefits awarded to veterans by the U.S. government. This 
commission, with an 18-month charter, was to evaluate, per direction of Congress,  the 
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similarities and dissimilarities of the World War II and Montgomery GI Bills. The 
Commission on Service Members and Veterans Transition was specifically charged with 
recommending a benefits package for veterans of the 21st century U.S. armed forces
(Adde, 1997a). An Associated Press wire story (  Bipartisan Pan,  1999) reported that this
commission, a 12-member nonpolitical panel, recommended that the U.S. government
pay full college costs, regardless of the university or college attended, for veterans who
serve at least 4 years of active duty. The commission also counseled Congress to provide
a $400-a-month stipend. This 21st Century GI Bill, as the  recommendation of this panel
is being called, should be modeled after and include an educational provision similar to
that offered after World War II, as suggested by all veterans  organizations and higher
education associations, including the Veterans of Foreign Wars (G. Lowe, VFW
Washington Office, personal communication, December 24, 1999).
Retired congressman G. V.   Sonny    Montgomery, the father of the Montgomery
GI Bill, urged in a July 19, 1997, hearing before the House Veterans  Affairs
Subcommittee, the cost of education has risen several fold since the MGIB was started in
1985, while the GI Bill has risen considerably less (Adde, 1997b). Montgomery was
appearing before the committee in support of HR 759, a bill that would increase the GI
Bill payment. If action was not taken, Montgomery concluded before the subcommittee,
the GI Bill would not continue to fulfill its desired goals (Adde, 1997b).
While committees study, small relief finds its way into recruiting programs. Since
October 1, 1999, the active and reserve forces have been authorized to award a bonus or
  kicker   to prior service personnel who reenlist in the active or reserve forces
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(Tsimekles, 1999). However, this   kicker,   which is an additional amount for college,
applies to few soldiers and does little to improve the overall GI Bill. 
Demonstrating  the issue of returning to general society after serving in the
military, an officer of the Noncommissioned Officers Association recently told Congress
that the GI Bill education benefit does not fulfill its goal of easing the transition to
civilian life (Rhea, 1999).  According to this organization, fewer than 40 % of service
members who earn the Montgomery GI Bill benefits ever use these benefits , because
they are unable to pay the difference between the earned and paid-for benefit and the cost
of college tuition and living expenses. Moreover,  the Montgomery GI Bill, since its
enactment in 1985, has increased less than 40%, while the cost of higher education has
increased, by some accounts, as much as 230 percent.
According to many, the GI Bill educational component is in trouble if it is not
saved soon. According to the VA, only 40% of veterans were using their GI Bill. For
1999, this figure is projected to be 55 percent. The VA, the U.S. government agency
responsible for administering the GI Bill,  is expressing concern over the low-use rate of
the GI Bill (Maze, 2000). 
In a detailed study of the history of higher education, Cohen (1998) suggested that
never again will we see a government program that will affect higher education in the
manner of the Morrill Acts of 1862 and 1890 and the Servicemen  s Readjustment Act of
1944. The changing purpose and continuing erosion in the economic value of the GI Bills
combined with ever-rising college tuition, make Cohen  s statement a present reality .
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Research Questions Findings
Specifically, in relationship to research question 1, the findings are that the GI
Bill for the veterans of WWII was primarily a U.S. economic tool and secondarily a
reward for service, whereas the primary purpose of subsequent GI Bills was and is
recruitment of men and women for the armed forces. This is important in that sufficient
money was paid to veterans of WWII to keep them in college and out of the job market,
whereas veterans of subsequent wars were recruited into service at a GI Bill rate that
does not enable many of them to enter or remain in college.
With regard to research question number 2, the GI Bill of WWII covered all costs
of a 4-year degree, whereas GI Bills for subsequent veterans cover approximately 50% or
less of a 4-year degree.
Summary of Major Findings
The major findings of this study are as follows:
1. A study of the four federal GI Bills reveals a steady erosion in the
economic value of the GI Bill, with the first, the Servicemen  s
Readjustment Act of 1944, being the most favorable to veterans.
2. The GI Bill of WWII was  viewed by government officials of the time
primarily as a tool for the efficacy of the postwar U.S. economy and
secondarily as a reward to veterans for their service. 
3. Subsequent to the WWII GI Bill, the focus of the purpose of GI Bills
shifted from the national economy to an incentive in recruiting.
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4. The first GI Bill to require a financial contribution from the veteran is the
current Montgomery GI Bill.
5. While the WWII GI Bill covered 100% of the cost of college attendance,
the Korean War, Vietnam, and Montgomery GI Bills have covered
approximately 50% of the cost of a 4-year college education. Moreover,
the WWII GI Bill covered almost all the costs of living expenses with a
stipend; subsequent GI bills have not provided a stipend.
6. The required service time to begin using the GI Bill has risen from the
WWII requirement of 90 days to the present Montgomery GI Bill
requirement of 2 years of service.
7. The first GI Bill covered the full cost of a 4-year education at private
institutions, such as Harvard University, whereas the present GI Bill does
not cover the cost of an education at low-cost universities such as Sul
Ross State in Texas.
8. Private universities and colleges and out-of-state tuition in universities and
colleges greatly exceed the payments offered by the Montgomery GI Bill.
Implications
In view of the above findings, the implications of the study are as follows:
1. The purpose of the G.I. Bill for veteran  educational benefits seems to
have changed from an economic philosophy to a recruitment incentive
philosophy. This change in philosophy may substantially affect the
economic value to the individual veteran.
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2. This change in purpose has resulted in the reduction in the time allowance
of the GI Bill from 48 months to 36 months, thus changing the total time,
as well as the amount, allocated for the pursuit of higher education.
3. The change in purpose results in present veterans having to make a
financial contribution toward their GI Bill.
4. The financial requirement on the part of the veteran comes at a time when
the veteran is in his or her 1st year of service, thus at his or her lowest pay
rate. This timing results in many service members  (a) having to draw food
stamps and (b) having to live in inadequate low-cost housing. Both cause
hardships on military families and single veterans..
5. The GI Bill of WWII required veterans to have served on active duty for
90 days before they could begin using their educational benefits, whereas
the present Montgomery GI Bill requires a minimum of 24 months of
active duty for minimal benefits. Thus, a veteran must serve longer to be
eligible for the educational benefit.
6. The GI Bill of WWII did not require a veteran to have a high school
diploma before use of the GI Bill, as does the current GI Bill. WWII
veterans were able to attend college at any college or university that
accepted them.
 Recommendations for Further Study
This study identified certain areas for further research. The areas recommended
for further study are as follows:
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 1. A study should be done concerning the costs that must be borne by the
veteran and the costs of the additional time for matriculation necessitated
by the low economic value associated with the present GI Bill.
2. A study should be undertaken concerning the effects of the low economic
value of the present GI Bill with regard to the relationship between the
time taken to acquire a 4-year degree and the costs associated with the
degree. 
3. A study should be pursued regarding the economic effects of a veteran
being a nontaxpayer or a low tax bracket taxpayer because of the
additional time taken to acquire a 4-year degree.
4. A study of the executive and congressional inquiry and decision-making
processes should be done to ascertain why present educational benefits for
veterans are substantially less than the original WWII benefits that were
and are credited with making  many positive social and economic
contributions to the United States. 
5. Considering the substantial impact on U.S. society of the GI Bill, a study
should be conducted on why GI Bill benefits do not presently cover the
full cost of a university or college degree.
6. A study should be done on the effects of the philosophical relationship
between the GI Bill  s purpose of affecting the U.S. economy and the
purpose of the GI Bill s being a recruitment incentive.
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7. A study should be conducted concerning the inflexibility of the payment
method associated with the present GI Bill. 
8. Finally, a comprehensive study, along the lines of that undertaken by the
1973  Committee on Veterans   Affairs, U.S. Senate, should be undertaken.
College tuition, fees, living expenses, and other costs of a 4-year
education have risen dramatically since 1973, making it difficult to apply
any of the findings of this report to the present situation of an inadequate
GI Bill.
Specific Recommendations for MGIB Revisions
The present Montgomery GI Bill is inadequate in that it fails to pay 100% of the
veterans   higher education and cost of living costs. Therefore, the chief investigator
recommends a full 100% cost coverage package for veterans attending higher education
institutions and/or taking college courses. Moreover, the benefits must be extended back
to the 48 months and the required service time for eligibility should be dropped to 90
days as with the original World War II GI Bill. Lastly, the GI Bill requirement of a high
school education before benefits can be used by the veteran should be dropped  the
matter of the high school diploma or equivalent credential should be between the
university and college of choice.  
With the current shortage of male and female volunteers for the U.S. military
services, the chief investigator believes that an enhanced GI Bill, one that covers all costs
of attending college, would serve as a viable recruitment incentive. Additionally, the
chief investigator recommends that those enlisting with the GI Bill option be provided
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the tools and resources, computers especially, to take advantage of the emerging
opportunities to acquire an education via long-distance learning. The GI Bill should fund
these computers and cover the tuition cost of Internet education, both while in and out of
service.    
Summary and Conclusions
The present study of the four GI Bills  parallels certain major findings of the
studies and works of Olson (1974), Bennett (1996), Rhea (1999) and Staton (2000) and
urges adoption of HR 4334 and S 2419.
1. This study agrees with Olson (1974) and Bennett (1996) that a primary
consideration for development and implementation of the WWII GI Bill
was the impact that 16 million veterans would have on the U.S. economy.
A college benefit as a reward for service was secondary. Additionally, the
benefit was not used as a manning or recruiting incentive before or during
WWII.
2. This study agrees with Rhea (1999) and Staton (2000) that the present GI
Bill is inadequate in that it has not kept pace with the economic value of
the original GI Bill.
3. The study agrees with the major findings of Rhea (1999) and Staton
(2000) that indicate a decline in the use of the GI Bill due to the declining
economic value of the bill. 
4. The study agrees with the statements of veterans and higher education
organizations appearing before congressional subcommittees and
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committees currently inquiring into the economic value of the GI Bill. It
also agrees with a number of the reported comments of committee
senators and representatives that the GI Bill should be increased
immediately to a benchmark level of the cost of an education at a public
commuter university and that this basic entitlement be increased as tuition
costs increase.
The results of this study will be shared with the appropriate governmental
agencies, higher education organizations, and veterans  organizations in the hope that
equity in the funding of education for veterans will be restored to the level of that granted
by the first GI Bill, the Servicemen s Readjustment Act of 1944. Further, it is hoped that
this study will ultimately prove valuable to the veterans who enlist in the armed forces




SAMPLING OF DISTINGUISHED AMERICANS WHO USED THE GI BILL
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1. President Gerald R. Ford
2. President George Bush
3. Vice President Albert Gore
4. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
5. Justice John Paul Stevens
6. Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher
7. Journalist David Brinkley
8. Journalist John Chancellor
9. Actor Clint Eastwood
10. Actor Paul Newman
11. Actor Jason Robards, Jr.
12. Pro Football Coach Tom Landry
13. Columnist Art Buchwald
14. Senator John Glenn
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